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Introduction
Financial analysts' role as information producers is crucial for financial markets. By issuing forecasts regarding the value of firms' shares or earnings per share (EPS), they reduce information asymmetries between firms and investors or fund managers. Generally issued on behalf of brokers, forecasts and selling or buying recommendations are widely used by fund managers for taking portfolio allocation decisions. However, many studies have demonstrated that analysts' earnings forecasts can be inaccurate (Brown, 1997) , thus increasing corporate agency costs, and reducing the informational efficiency of financial markets.
A large literature has developed, suggesting that close relationships between firms and analysts strongly matter for earnings forecasts or recommendations. As underlined by Michaely and Womack (1999) , proximity between a firm and an analyst should improve the quality of information and the accuracy of forecasts or recommendations produced by analysts. Measuring the relationship intensity by the geographical distance between firms' headquarters and analysts, Malloy (2005) reports that closer analysts issue more accurate forecasts. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2010) focus on the role played by social network in the dissemination of information. They show that analysts are more likely to outperform on their buying recommendations when they had an educational link with the firm's management, i.e. when they attended the same institution as a senior officer or a board member of the firm.
In these contributions, the existence of a close tie between firms and analysts appears as an unintentional determinant of forecast accuracy. However, another strand of literature indicates that analysts may be encouraged to intentionally biase their forecasts or recommendations in order to please the firm' manager and to cultivate their relationship with him. According to this view, the firmanalyst relationship decreases, rather than increases, the accuracy of the analyst's forecast.
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A first set of paper is dedicated to conflicts of interest that can arise when the analyst is linked to an investment banking that provides underwritting, Initial Private Offerings (IPO) or merger services .
Biasing forecasts or recommendations allows the analyst to please his employer by allowing him to win or to preserve potentially lucrative customer relationship with the firm. On the one hand, issuing pessimistic forecasts is a means for the analyst to secure the underwritting or the IPO conducted by his employer by making newly issued shares particularly attractive for investors. On the other hand, because pessimistic forecasts avoid managers to create a negative earnings surprise when they annouce the actual EPS, analysts may also be encouraged to win the favor of the firm's manager by biasing forecasts dowward. In this approach, the firm-analyst relationship's intensity is mainly measured through institutional indicators, such as being (or not) affiliated to an investment banking that underwrites securities (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and MacNichols, 1998) or completes IPO and mergers (Hayward Hayward and Boeker, 1998; Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) ; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Lin, Mac Nichols and O'Brien, 2005) .
Because they account for closeness between investment banks (themselves tied to firms through investment services) and analysts rather than between firms and analysts, such measures are only indirect. Moreover, they do not allow to capture another crucial dimension of the firm-analyst relationship. As analysts also provide to their clients, mainly fund managers, non-financial and 'raw' information, they are concerned about participating to phone calls, one-on-one meetings and conference calls organized by the firm (Barber, Lehavy and Trueman 2007; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Breton and Taffler, 2001) . For this reason, analysts are encouraged to please the firm's manager and to cultivate a close relationship in order to maintain their access to information selectively disclosed by the firm's manager. Biasing their forecasts is as a means to reach this goal. Its consists either to issue optimistic forecasts, to create a positive reaction from stock markets, or to produce pessimistic forecasts, to allow the firm manager to avoid negative earnings surprises at the announcement of actual hal-00862996, version 1 -18 Sep 2013 earnings (Libby, Hunton, Tan and Seybert, 2008) . To check for this argument, the empirical literature mainly resort to indirect tests. For example, Lim01 provides evidence that highly experienced analysts, who are less concerned with preserving their relationships with firm managers, are generally less optimistic than low-experience ones. Similarly, Das et al. (1998) and Francis and Philbrick (1993) show that optimistic forecasts or recommendations are all the more optimistic when firms received unfavorable ratings from the well-known American financial publication Value Line. Their interpretation of this result is that the need to preserve their relationships with firm managers is stronger for badlyrated firms. Finally, although these findings suggest that analysts are prompt to biase their forecasts to keep the favor of the firms' management, they do not provide any explicit measure of the firm-analyst relationship and of its contribution to the forecast process. This is precisely the aim of this paper to propose a direct, explicit and comprehensive measure of the firm-analyst relationship's intensity and to check whether a close tie between a firm and an analyst, as measured by our innovative indicator, is associated with intentional biased (optimistic or optimistic) EPS forecats. To do so, we use an IBES data set provided by ThomsonReuters, which contains forecasts issued by 4 648 analysts regarding the earnings of 241 French firms between 1997 and 2007.
We regress the analysts' forecast accuracy on its unintentional determinants. We then capture the disturbance term of the regression and we compute a measure of the relationship intensity based on the firm-analyst specific effect. We then study the link between this indicator and analysts' forecasts to determine whether high (negative or positive) forecast errors are associated with a high firm-analyst pair effect. We provide interesting evidence that the need to preserve their relationships with firm managers prompts analysts to issue biased (pessimistic or optimistic) forecasts about firms' EPS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background of our research. Section 3 presents our empirical investigation while our results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 considers some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.

Literature
In this section, we review the literature dedicated to forecast accuracy and its determinants. We first focus on unintentional drivers of forecast accuracy (firms', analysts' and pairs' characteristics).
Then, we point out the intentional determinant of biased forecasts, based on the analyst' concern for creating or preserving a friendly relationship with firms' management.
Unintentional Determinants of Forecast Accuracy
Analysts' forecasts can be unintentionally inaccurate for three reasons. First, firm characteristics can make its EPS difficult to predict. Second, the characteristics of the analyst might reduce its ability to forecast. Finally, the characteristics of both the firm and the analyst can decrease the analyst's ability to predict the firm's EPS.
Firms' Characteristics
Concerning the firm characteristics, the empirical literature documents that forecast errors are negatively correlated with information availability and earnings predictability. Using a data set of firms from the Value Line Survey between 1989 and 1993, DasLevine98 report that the forecast error (the difference between forecasted and realized earnings) increases in firms' profit volatility. This result is confirmed by Lim01 using a set of forecasts provided by I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimate System) for the period 1984-1996. Further corroboration is provided by Jackson05 who employs a data set of brokers on the Australian security market over the period 1992-2002. Moreover, as greater public information is available for large firms and those followed by a large number of analysts, optimism is shown to decrease in firm size (Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001; Jackson, 2005) and analyst coverage (Lim, 2001) . Regarding interactions between the determinants of forecast accuracy, DasLevine98 establish that analyst coverage mitigates the increasing effect of earnings volatility on forecast optimism. Finally,
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past optimistic consensus about a firm deters analysts from contradicting the consensus forecast when it is inaccurate and thus increase their forecast error (Lim, 2001 ).
Analysts' Characteristics
Analyst characteristics also affect earnings forecasts. Using a set of I/B/E/S forecasts over the period 1983-1994, Clement99 finds that general experience, measured by the number of years in which an analyst supplied at least one forecast, is associated with accuracy. When general experience increases, two effects are at play. First, the skill of the analyst increases, due to a learning-by-doing process. Second, the analyst is identified as highly capable because low-skilled analysts do not last in the profession. Forecast error also increases in the complexity of the analyst's portfolio (Clement, 1999) .
When an analyst follows a large number of firms, he devotes less resources to each one. When he follows a large number of industrial sectors, he benefits from sector specialization to a lesser extent.
Another important characteristic is the size of the broker employing the analyst. This feature affects forecast accuracy and optimism bias. As a large broker can devote more resources to analyzing firms, analysts issue more accurate forecasts (Clement, 1999) . This result is confirmed by Clement and Tse (2005) using an I/B/E/S dataset from 1989 to 1998.
Firm-analysts' Characteristics
Finally, firm-analyst characteristics are important determinants of forecast accuracy. For the same reasons as above (learning-by-doing and analyst survival effects), specific experience, measured by the number of years in which an analyst supplied at least one forecast on a given firm, should increase forecast accuracy. Clement's (1999) results are in accordance with this assumption. He reveals a hal-00862996, version 1 -18 Sep 2013 negative relationship between specific experience and the absolute value of the forecast error. Using a set of I/B/E/S forecasts between 1988 and 2000, Clarke06 confirm the role of specific experience. The forecast frequency is a signal of forecast accuracy, in the sense that analysts react more to new information about a given firm when the frequency is high. This result appears in Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999), using a Zacks Investment Research database from 1981 to 1992. It is also the case in Clement (1999), Clement and Tse (2005) . In the same vein, those studies reveal that the time elapsed between two forecasts indicates how outdated the forecast is: the longer a forecast goes unrevised, the less accurate it is. They also provide evidence that the greater the forecast horizon, the less accurate it is.
Finally, Brown (2001), using an I/B/E/S database over 1986-1998 as well as Clement and Tse (2005) , and Clarke and Subramanian (2006) , explore the role played by past accuracy. They find that low past accuracy is associated with a low current absolute value of the difference between forecasted and actual earnings. This result suggests that forecast errors are persistent.
The Concern to Establish or to Maintain a Good Relationship with the Firm's Management
Sell-side analysts can also be encouraged to intentionnally biase their EPS forecasts in order to establish or to maintain a friendly relationship with the firm's management. This behaviour has at least two sources.
Conflicts of Interest
First, the desire not to compromise its relationship with a firm's manager can emerge when the analyst is linked to (employed by) a financial institution that provides investment banking services to the firm.
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On the one hand, issuing optimistic forecasts or recommendations on a firm allows the analyst to please his employer by helping him to win or to preserve potentially lucrative customer relationship with the firm . This theoretical intuition is confirmed by Dugar and Nathan (1995) . Using a sample of 400 firms traded on the NYSE/AMEX between 1983 and 1988, they document that analysts in investment banking produce more optimistic forecasts and recommendations than others. Among various investment banking services that can give birth to conflicts of interest, underwritting has received particular attention in the literature. When an investment bank has been hired as a lead-or counderwritter, optimist forecasts allow the analyst to secure the underwriting activity of the investment bank by enticing investors to buy newly issued securities. Relying on an I/B/E/S data set over the period 1989 -1994 , Lin and MacNichols (1998 find that affiliated analysts, i.e. analysts employed by an investment bank that intervenes as a lead-or co-underwriter for a firm issue more optimistic forecasts about this firm than non-affiliated analysts. This result also holds in the case of analysts' recommendations, as shown by Michaely and Womack (1999) , using a data set of 391 IPO on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ in 1990 and 1991, and by McKnight, Tavakoli and Weir (2010) , relying on a large I/B/E/S data set covering 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom). fINALLY, investment banking services that consists to complete IPO or mergers also create conflicts of interest (Michaely and Womack, 1999) . Here again, analysts have strong incentive to issue optimistic forecasts about a firm when the investment bank they are linked to takes this firm to the market. Using a sample of I/B/E/S forecasts between 1981 and 1990 , Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (2000 show that analysts who are employed by an investment bank that manages a public offering issue more optimistic forecasts than others. Michaely & Womack (1999) and Lin, Mac Nichols and O'Brien (2005) observe the same bias for analysts' recommendations.
On the other hand, issuing pessimistic forecast is also a means for an analyst to please a firm's manager. The desire to win or to keep a customer for investment banking business can encourage analysts to make a pessimistic forecast in order to avoid the firm's manager to create a negative earnings surprise when he reports actual EPS. As shown by the literature on the 'earnings management strategy' (Payne and Robb, 2000; Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006) , this strategy consists of the manipulation of earnings forecasts such that the actual EPS ultimately appears to be higher than the forecast. In this case, investors in financial markets may have a favorable reaction, thus increasing the price of firm's shares. Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003) report that this behaviour has been particularly strong during the bull market of the 90ies (during which investment banking business was booming) and for growth stocks (which are the most likely to need investment banking services in the future).
Altogether, these arguments suggest that the desire to preserve or to create a priviligied investment banking relationship with a firm can encourage analysts to issue biased (either optimistic or pessimistic) forecasts or recommendations about this firm.
The Access to Information Selectively Disclosed by Firm's Management
Second, it is noteworthy that analysts do not only provide EPS forecasts but also 'raw' information about firms to their customers. This information, which is highly valued by fund managers (Barker, 1998) , refers to firm strategy, management methods, inside organization or relationships between the firm and customers or its suppliers... It is selectively disclosed by firms' managers through phone calls, one-on-one meetings and conference calls (Barber, Lehavy and Trueman 2007; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Breton and Taffler, 2001 ) . As it is important for analysts to preserve their access to this hal-00862996, version 1 -18 Sep 2013 information, they are prone to adopt forecasting behavior that satisfies firms' managers, notably by issuing inacurate forecasts. Consequently, the forecast can be biased in two ways.
On the one hand, the analyst can issue optimistic forecasts, with the aim of presenting the firm under a favourable light and creating a positive reaction from stock markets (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Lim, 2001 ). Pratt93, Gibson95, Womack96 and BoniWomack02 provide several examples of situations in which analysts lost access to a firm's manager due to an unfavorable recommendation or earnings forecast about the firm. Moreover, Das et al. (1998) reveal that the need to preserve their relationships with managers entices analysts to issue particularly optimistic forecasts about firms that received unfavorable ratings from the well-known American financial publication Value Line. The same result is obtained by Francis and Philbrick (1993) using a set of Value Line recommendations for 1987, 1988 and 1989 . Finally, highly experienced analysts, who are less concerned with preserving their relationships with firm managers, are shown to be less optimistic than others (Lim, 2001 ).
On the other hand, as explained in the previous section, the analyst can issue pessimistic forecasts to please the firm's manager by allowing him to 'beat the forecast' at the earnings announcement and prompt a positive earnings surprise on the market or, at least, avoid a negative surprise.
The view that the concern for maintaining their access to selectively disclosed information encourages analysts to issue either optimistic or pessimistic forecasts is globally corroborated by Libby, Hunton, Tan and Seybert (2008) . Conducting an experiment on a set of 81 brokerage analysts, the authors report that forecasts are all the more biased (optimistic or pessimistic) when the analyst has a friendly relationship with the firm's management. Analysts recognize that this strategy is intentional and mainly due to the concern for keeping the favor of the firms' management and to preserve their access to selective information disclosure.
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Taken together, these contributions suggest that (positive or negative) forecast errors also depend on the analyst's concern to please firm managers in order not to compromise his access to the firm's management.
Empirical Investigation
Turning to our empirical investigation, we present our general methodology, as well as our data and econometric model.
General Methodology
Taken together, the arguments provided in the previous section lead us to state the following testable assumption: H1: High (negative or positive) forecast errors are associated with a close relationship between a firm and an analyst.
Hence, the goal of our econometric study is to assess the strength of the relationship between a firm and an analyst in earnings forecasts. The main contribution of our empirical approach is to propose an explicit and comprehensive measure of the firm-analyst relationship's intensity. Regressing the analysts' forecast accuracy on observable and unintentional determinants described in section 2.1, we decompose the fixed-effect of the estimate into firm-specific, analyst-specific, and firm-analyst specific effects. This allows us to compute a measure of the relationship intensity based on the firm-analyst specific effect. We then study the link between this indicator and analysts' forecasts to determine whether the relationship intensity contributes to biased (pessimistic or optimistic) EPS forecasts.
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Data
We use data provided by ThomsonReuters. These data include I/B/E/S earnings forecasts and additional data from Worldscope. Our sample contains 241 French firms from the largest Paris' stock index SBF 250, diversified according to the firms' size and sector. We study one-year ahead EPS forecasts by 4 648 analysts from 1997 to 2007 on a monthly basis. This raw database consists of 265 238 firmanalyst-time observations. Several steps were required to clean the data. First, once issued, a forecast is frequently repeated for several months in the database. We obtained the number of monthly occurrences of each forecast by storing it in a variable called . Then, for each forecast, we dropped repeated occurrences of the same forecast, to avoid artificially counting it several times. Second, the date of realized EPS, i.e., the final day of the fiscal year's, was carefully checked. While some firms do not close their fiscal years prior to the 31st of December, the database systematically reports the realized EPS each month from January to December. Thus, some EPS artificially appear in January in the database although they are issued in march, for example. When a difference was detected, forecast errors were computed using fiscal years and not calendar years. Third, we dropped aberrant observations (for example when there are several different forecasts from the same analyst, on the same day, regarding the same firm, etc). As the reported forecasts are supposed to be one-year ahead earnings forecasts, we created a variable denoted , measuring the number of days between the earnings announcement date and the forecast release date. We then dropped forecasts with a negative 'horizon' value, or with a 'horizon' value exceeding 365 days (366 for leap years). Finally we obtain 102 876 firm-analyst-time forecast' observations.
Econometric model
Assessing the importance of a priviligied relationship between a firm and an analyst in analysts' forecasts requires two steps, which are presented in the two following subsections.
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3.3.1 First Step: Estimation The first step of our investigation consists of estimating the following model:
(1)
The dependent variable, denoted , is the absolute forecast error for the firm 's EPS, forecasted by analyst at date .
Our empirical model contains three sets of explanatory variables. The variable denotes firm characteristics which are invariant across analysts in . Symmetrically, denotes analyst characteristics which are invariant across firms in . Finally, contains a set of variables which are specific both to firm and analyst in . The dummy variables indicate a specific analyst or a firm . The disturbance effect is decomposed into three effects: the firm-specific effect , the analyst-specific effect , and the pairspecific effect . Finally, denotes the time-specific effect. We assume that these effects are fixed (non stochastic). However, it is well known that the use of a within approach (OLS on demeaned variables) in the presence of invariant and/or rarely changing variables may lead to inefficiency and incorrect inferences. In model (1), this issue could arise not only in the firm's dimension but also in the analyst's dimension Indeed, many of our explanatory variables and/or exhibit very small variation in one of these dimensions. Therefore we propose the use the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) methodology proposed by Plümper and Troeger (2007) . This approach consists of a three-stage procedure (similar to that proposed by Mundlak (1978) In line with determinants presented in section 2.1, when estimating model (1), we consider three categories of explanatory variables. Variables denoted refer to firms' characteristics.As shown by Jackson05, the absolute forecast error is expected to increase in earnings predictability (denoted ), decrease in firm size (denoted ) and decrease in analysts coverage (denoted ). Following DasLevine98, we also consider two interactive terms. The term . accounts for interactions between EPS predictability and firm size. As firm size should mitigate impact of EPS variability, its coefficient should be negative.
The term . stands for interactions between EPS predictability and coverage. For the same reason as above, its coefficient should be negative. Finally, as in Lim01, we include past optimistic consensus about a firm, denoted . The expected sign of this variable is positive.
The second category of explanatory variables refer to analysts' characteristics, denoted . As underlined by Clement99, absolute forecast errors are expected to: decrease in , which stands for the general experience of analyst , increase with and , the number of firms and the number of sectors followed by the analyst respectively, and decrease in , the size of the brokerage house.
The third category of variables relates to determinants specific both to firm and analyst in , .
First, as in Clarke06 and Clement99, the error should decrease with , the specific experience of analyst with firm . Following Clement05, absolute forecast errors should: be greater if the forecast is far from the end of the fiscal year (variable denoted ), decrease if the analyst frequently revises his forecasts (variable denoted ), and hence increase in the forecast's lifetime in the database (variable denoted ) and increase in past errors (variable denoted ). Table 1 , in the Appendix, reports the list of regression variables mentioned above and how they are computed while Tables 2 and 3 , also in the Appendix, provide summary statistics and correlation coefficients, respectively. The coefficients reported in Table 3 correlations. The forecast error of analyst for firm is positively correlated with the degree of firm EPS predictability, the past median forecast error regarding firm , the number of firms and sectors covered by analyst , the number of days to the fiscal year end and the latest forecast for the firm-analyst pair. It is negatively correlated with the size of firm , the general and the specific experience of analyst , the size of the broker and the forecast's lifetime in the database. Some other correlations are also noteworthy. First, specific and general experience are positively correlated. Moreover, both variables are positively linked to the size of the broker and the frequency of forecasts. Finally, there is also a negative correlation between the size of the firm and its degree of EPS variability, which lends some support to the notion that mitigates the positive impact of on the forecast error.
Second Step: Analyzing the Pair-Specific Effect
In a second step, we focus on the pair-specific effect of our estimate to measure the intensity of the relationship between the firm and the analyst that is not captured in the unintentional determinants defined in the previous section.
Our methodology decomposes the fixed effect of the panel regression into three components: the firm effect ( ), the analyst effect ( ), and the firm-analyst' pair effect ( ).
Having estimated our model, we are able to compute , the 'contribution of the pair-specific effect', defined as follows:
, where is the unconditional constant of the regression. The pair-specific effect, computed by the STATA procedure of PlumperTroeger07, is centered on a mean calculated over all observations.
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Adding the unconditional constant in both the denominator and the numerator of makes it possible to correct for this bias and construct a consistent indicator.
, defined as the pair-specific effect in absolute value relative to the absolute value of the total fixed effect, measures the importance of the pair-specific effect as a determinant of , relative to firmspecific and analyst-specific effects. For a given forecast, the greater the contribution of the pair-specific effect, the closer the relationship between a particular firm and a particular analyst. When is low, the unexplained component of the forecast error is primarily due to either the firm alone or to the analyst alone. When is high, the unexplained component of the forecast error is primarily due to the specific firm -analyst pair. Finally, we rank observations by 'twentiles' of the relative median forecast error , defined as the median, over the full sample period, of the difference between the EPS forecasts and the EPS realization of each firm by each analyst for a forecast issued in . We obtain 20 groups from the 5% most pessimistic to the 5% most optimistic . For each observation of , we are able to match the value that concerns the analyst and the firm involved in this observation. We then compute the mean value of for each 'twentile' (from the 5% most pessimistic to the 5% most optimistic). We plot the median forecast error 'twentiles' against the pair effect contribution. Such a graph should allow us to verify our testable assumption H1. If we observe that is greater for the most extreme (negative or positive) forecast error 'twentiles', this means that the pair effect accounts for most of the residuals when the forecast error is high. In other words, controlling for all observed variables (including analyst and firm dummies), the unintentional factors specifically related to the firm -analyst pair play a greater role than analyst-or firm-specific intentional factors, when the forecast error is high. We interpret this result as the demonstration of the role played by the firm-analyst relationship. It captures the fact that the need to maintain access to the firm's management provide analysts with an incentive to issue pessimistic or optimistic forecasts. Conversely, we should observe that is weaker for central 'twentiles' (i.e. forecast error around zero). If this prediction is true, H1 is validated.
To make sure the contribution of the pair effect differs according to the size of the forecast error, we also test for the relationship between and . We first conduct a median test that allows us to investigate whether the median of in a given 'twentile' equals the median of the full sample. We then conduct the Bartlett test that checks for the equality of variance of across 'twentiles'. Finally, we use the Krusal-Wallis equality-of-population rank test, which determines whether the rank sum of each observation ranked by differs across 'twentiles'.
Results
We now present our findings. We first present our results concerning the estimation of model [1] . Second, we comment on our findingsconcerning the relationship between the pair effect contribution and the forecast error.
Results of Panel Regressions with Vector Decomposition
The results of panel regressions with vector decomposition for model [1] are reported in Table   4 , in the Appendix. Although the aim of our study is check for the role of the relationship intensity in analysts' forecasts errors, we briefly comment on the results we obtained concerning observable and unintentional determinants. First, we focus on variables , that capture firm-specific characteristics. We observe that has a positive impact on the dependent variable, suggesting that the more difficult it is to predict the firm's EPS, the larger the analyst's forecast error (Das et al., 1998; Lim, 2001; Jackson, 2005) . has a negative impact on the dependent variable. As public information availability is enhanced for firms followed by a large number of analysts, a higher analyst coverage decreases forecast error (Lim, 2001) .
The coefficient for the interaction term also has the expected negative sign. This finding indicates that analyst coverage mitigates the impact of EPS variability (Das et al., 1998) . Finally, following Lim (2001) , the coefficient for has the expected positive sign. The greater the past optimistic consensus, the larger hal-00862996, version 1 -18 Sep 2013 the analysts' forecast error. Table 4 also indicates that, in contrast to the prior empirical literature, a firm's size has no effect on the dependent variable. Finally, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive, indicating that firm size amplifies the impact of EPS variability.
We now turn to variables , that represent analysts' characteristics. General experience ( ) reduces forecast error. In line with Clement99 and Lim01, the greater the general experience of the analyst, the lower the analysts' forecast error. has a significant and positive sign. when an analyst follows a large number of firms, he dedicates fewer resources to each of them such that the forecast error is higher (Clement, 1999) . Table 4 also reveals that the number of sectors followed by the analyst ( ) has no impact on the dependent variable. Finally, as expected, the coefficient for has a significant and negative sign. This result, which is in line with Lim01 and Clement99, suggests that being employed by a large broker allows an analyst to dedicate more resources to prediction and produce more accurate forecasts.
Finally, we comment on our results concerning variables , that are specific both to firm and analyst . First, the coefficient for exhibits a negative sign: as expected, the absolute forecast error decreases in the specific experience of analysts. In line with theory, the coefficient for is significant and positive: the further from the end of the fiscal year, the less accurate the analyst's forecast. However, while the coefficient for is not significant, the coefficient for is positive, which is not the expected impact on the dependent variable. Finally, has the expected positive sign, which indicates inertia in forecast dynamics.
Results Concerning the Pair-specific Effect
Let us now concentrate on the graph of pair effect contribution by 'twentiles' of median and . This is represented by a convex curve. is at its lowest level when lies in the tenth 'twentile'. When the forecast error is weak, the pair effect only accounts for approximately 30% of the total fixed effect.
When the forecast error is high, the pair effect account for over 40% of the fixed effect. This result is interesting for at least two reasons. First, it suggests that the relationship between and can be represented by a non-linear curve. Second, this finding indicates that the contribution of the pairspecific effect reaches its minimum for intermediate values of while is at its maximum for both the most optimistic and the most pessimistic forecast 'twentile'. This observation means that the contribution of the pair-specific effect is more important when the forecast error is high.
Our results thus validate our testable assumption H1 and provide evidence that the firm-analyst relationship matters for earnings forecasts. They suggest that some analysts attempt to create or to maintain friendly relationships with some firms' managers in order to generate investment banking business or to maintain their access to selectively disclosed information and that this leads them to intentionally biasing their EPS forecasts. It is noteworthy that this effect appears after capturing observable and unintentional determinants of the forecast accuracy. A forecast error can be observed because the firm is particularly difficult to predict, because the analyst as low inability to predict or because both firm's and analyst's characteristics decrease the analyst's ability to predict the firm's EPS.
But as all these elements have been accounted for, the remaining forecast error reflects the intentional impact of the firm-analyst relationship in the forecasting process.
Finally, the results of the median test, the Bartlett test and the Krusal-Wallis test are reported in Table 5 , in the Appendix. They confirm that for each test, testable assumption H1 is validated: the contribution of the pair effect differs according to the size of the forecast error.
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Robustness Checks
In this section, we propose two robustness checks for our findings. We first estimate several variants of our model, inspired by the literature. We then discuss the FEVD estimator.
Variants of the Model
First, we estimate several variants of model [1] . The goal of this subsection is to 'reproduce', using ou own sample, the estimates conducted in some papers in the empirical literature and to examine whether they result in the same representations of by 'twentiles' of as model [1] .
In variant [2], we refer to the estimate by Jackson05, which only considers earnings predictability ( ), firm size ( ) and analysts coverage ( ). Specification [3] relates to the study by Table 6 , in Appendix. Except some rare cases, they are globally consistent with the literature and with findings obtained in the previous section. pessimistic forecast 'twentile' . Overall, these findings reinforce the notion that the desire to create or to maintain good relationships with firm managers incentivizes some analysts to issue pessimistic or optimistic forecasts.
The results of the median test, the Bartlett test and the Krusal-Wallis equality-of-population rank test for variants 2 to 6 are reported in Table 7 , in the Appendix. They indicate that for each test, the contribution of the pair effect differs according to the size of the forecast error. This result seems particularly robust since its holds for each of our five variants.
Discussion on the FEVD Estimator
In this section, we discuss the FEVD estimator used to estimate model Hausman and Taylor's, 1981, approach) are controversial. One advantage of the FEVD is that, as the Fixed Effects (Within) estimator, and unlike that of Hausman and Taylor, it does not require specifying the exogeneity status of the explanatory variables. For Greene (2011) , the FEVD estimator simply reproduces (identically) the linear fixed effects (dummy variable) estimator, and then substitutes an inappropriate covariance matrix for the correct one. This is why we propose an additional estimate of the covariance matrix here.
The results reported in Section 4 are based on the covariance matrix defined in the context of the three stages estimation procedure by Plümper and Troeger (2007) . In Table 8 Greene's (2011) argument has limited relevance for our purposes, which is to investigate the relationship between pair effects and forecast errors. Our results indicate that in most cases, standard errors using the covariance matrix from the first stage of the estimation procedure of Plümper and Troeger (2007) , as is proposed by Greene (2011) , are higher than those obtained through the third stage. Although this observation modifies the significance of the coefficients reported in Section 4, the coefficients and residuals remain unchanged. Therefore our use of the decomposition of the fixed effect is appropriate for our data and purposes.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to determine whether the analysts' concern for winning or preserving the favor of firm's management provides them with incentives to intentionally issue biased (optimistic or pessimistic) forecasts. We employed a Thomson Reuters data set that contains the forecasts issued by 4 648 analysts concerning the earnings of 243 French firms over the period 1997-
2007.
One important innovation of our approach is to propose a comprehensive and explicit measure of the relationship that exists between a firm and an analyst. Having regressed analysts forecast error on unintentional firm-specific, analyst-specific and pair-specific determinants, we decompose the disturbance effect to extract a pair-specific effect. This effect provides a measure of the firm-analyst relationship, allowing us to determine whether closeness between firms and analysts contributes to analysts' pessimism or optimism. Finally, we provide interesting evidence that the need to create or to preserve relationships with firms' managers encourages some analysts to issue pessimistic forecasts while prompting some others to issue optimistic forecasts about firms' EPS.
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Our results undoubtedly call for further research. Of course, our work could be extended to the case of other countries, to determine whether the effect of the telationship between firms and analysts has a national dimension. More ambitiously, it would be interesting to examine the consequences of analysts' forecast on portfolio investment strategies. 
List of regression variables Table 1 . Variables described in Table 1 2 presents descriptive statistics for variables. The sample period is from 1997 to 2007. The statistics are both crosssectional and cross-period. AFE is the absolute difference between the EPS forecast and the EPS realization of each firm i by each analyst j at date t of forecast issue. EPSPREV is the volatility of firm i 's EPS over the last 3 years. SIZE is the log of the market capitalization of firm i in t . COVER is the number of analysts who follow firm i in t . PASTMedFE is, for each firm i , the median of the difference between the consensus and the realized EPS in the previous year. GENEXP is, in t , the number of days since the analyst's first forecast. NBFIRM is the number of firms followed by analyst j in t . NBSECT is the number of sectors followed by analyst j in t . BROKER is the number of analysts working for analyst j ' Table 4 . Table 4 presents the results of panel regression for the following model: Plümper and Troeger (2007) . * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The median-test investigates whether the median of j i C , in a given 'twentile' equals the median of the full sample. The Bartlett-test tests for the equality of variance of j i C , across 'twentiles'. The Krusal-Wallis is an equality-of-population rank test, which determines whether the rank sum of each observation ranked by j i C , differs across 'twentiles'. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The null is the equality of the rank-sum of each observation ranked by j i C , across 'twentiles'.
Variables (expected sign)
Firms' characteristics
Median test (Chi
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Results of panel regression with vector decomposition for variants [2] to [6] Table 6 . Table 6 presents the results obtained when we 'reproduce', using our own sample, the estimates conducted in some papers in the empirical literature. Standard deviations using the FEVD procedure and using the covariance matrix proposed Table 8 reports the value of the standard errors obtained using the covariance matrix proposed by Greene (2011) , which corresponds to the matrix estimated in the first stage of the Plümper and Troeger (2007) procedure. In parentheses: standard error using the FEVD procedure. In italics: the standard errors using the covariance matrix proposed by Greene (2011 
